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COMMENTS
Directives and the Doctrine of Direct
Effect: A Critique of Marshall v
Southampton Area Health Authority
Robert Scarborought
Throughout its history, the European Community ("EC" or
"Community") has struggled with the failure of Member States to
comply with Community law. Even during the late 1950s and early
1960s, a period of relative enthusiasm about a more united Europe,
Member States often breached their Community obligations by
failing to incorporate provisions of the EEC Treaty ("Treaty") or a
directive into national law. Today, noncompliance with directives
remains "the most typical and frequent form of member-state in-
fraction" of Community law.1
.Failure by a Member State to adopt legislation pursuant to a
Treaty provision or directive results in the uneven application of
Community law. To discourage this and to minimize the incentives
for Member States to delay the implementation of a Treaty provi-
sion or directive, the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") developed
the doctrine of direct effect. 2 This doctrine requires that national
courts give effect to a right, granted in a sufficiently clear and un-
conditional instrument of Community law,3 regardless of a conflict-
ing national law. Thus, even when a Member State fails to imple-
t B.A. 1986, University of Iowa; M.A. 1990, Harvard University; J.D. Candidate 1993,
University of Chicago.
' G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, in Stanley Hoffmann
and Robert 0. Keohane, eds, The New European Community 177, 182 (Westview, 1990).
Though noncompliance with directives may be a frequent type of Community law violation,
Member States nonetheless implement most directives.
2 For a more thorough discussion of the direct effect doctrine see, generally, Gerhard
Bebr, Development of Judicial Control of the European Communities, 548-611 (Martinus
Nijhoff, 1981). See also, Trevor Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law,
183-218 (Clarendon Press, 1988).
' For a detailed discussion of these requirements, see Hartley, Foundations at 187-94
(cited in note 2).
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ment a Treaty provision or directive, an individual may be able to
rely on it in a national court."
The ECJ originally developed the doctrine in response to the
reluctance of some Member States to incorporate certain provi-
sions of the Treaty into national law. In the case establishing the
direct effect doctrine, Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Adminis-
tratie der Berlastingen, the ECJ held that a sufficiently clear and
unconditional Treaty provision grants justiciable rights that an in-
dividual could enforce against a Member State in a national court.
The ECJ further extended the 4cope of the direct effect doctrine in
Defrenne v Soci~t6 Anonyme Belge de Navigation A~rienne
Sabena,' holding that a individual may invoke a Treaty provision
against another individual as well as a Member State. After
Defrenne, an individual could enforce a right, granted in suffi-
ciently clear and unconditional Treaty provision, regardless of the
opposing party's status.7
The ECJ in Grad v Finanzamt Traunstein implicitly ex-
tended the doctrine of direct effect to cover directives, holding that
an individual could enforce-against a Member State-a right out-
lined in a directive." In Marshall v Southampton & South-West
Hampshire Area Health Authority, however, the ECJ rejected the
argument that an individual could invoke a directive against an-
other individual.9
This Comment argues that the ECJ decided Marshall incor-
rectly. Parts I and II develop the reasoning in Grad and Marshall
To understand how the doctrine of direct effect works, consider the following exam-
ple. A woman and a man are employed as flight attendants for the same privately owned
airline and have identical seniority and qualifications. The male flight attendant earns sev-
eral thousand dollars more doing the same work as his female counterpart. Though existing
national law may permit a private company to engage in wage discrimination, Article 119 of
the EEC Treaty requires that men and women receive equal pay for equal work. The doc-
trine of direct effect, therefore, enables the female flight attendant to seek a remedy for
wage discrimination in a national court citing the Treaty as the source of her right. These
are roughly the facts from Case 43/75, Defrenne v Socit6 Anonyme Belge de Navigation
Adrienne Sabena, 1976 ECR 455, 1976:2 CMLR 98.
' Case 26/62, 1963 ECR 1, 1963 CMLR 105.
6 Case 43/75, 1976 ECR 455.
7 Not all provisions of the Treaty satisfy the clear and unconditional requirements. For
a survey of those Treaty sections that the ECJ has deemed to be directly effective, see
Pierre Pescatore, The Doctrine of "Direct Effect": An Infant Disease of Community Law, 8
Eur L Rev 155, 160 n 11 (1983).
' Case 9/70, 1970 ECR 825, 841, 1971 CMLR 1.
' Case 152/84, 1986 ECR 723, 749, 1986:1 CMLR 688.
Unlike provisions of the Treaty, a directive cannot in principle impose obligations on




in order to highlight the Marshall court's sharp departure from
earlier direct effect cases and to argue that the line of cases based
on Grad was correctly decided. Part III emphasizes the central
weaknesses of the Marshall approach to the direct effect of direc-
tives. In particular, Marshall failed to consider that allowing an
individual to enforce a right granted in a directive only against a
Member State impedes the uniform application of Community law.
Additionally, the ECJ failed to critically assess the largely specious
argument that allowing directives to impose obligations directly on
individuals would create grave problems of notice and legal uncer-
tainty. Part IV explores parallel developments in the court's direct
effect jurisprudence that appear to limit Marshall's reach. To-
gether, these parts develop the thesis that the direct effect doctrine
should apply to directives to the same extent that it applies to cer-
tain provisions of the Treaty.
I. DIRECTIVES AND THE DIRECT EFFECT DOCTRINE
In Grad v Finanzamt Traunstein, the ECJ held that an indi-
vidual could rely on a directive, as against a Member State, even
though the latter had failed to incorporate the directive into na-
tional law. ° In reaching this conclusion, the ECJ overcame argu-
ments, advanced by Member States opposed to the doctrine's ex-
tension, that the text and structuie of the Treaty prevent
directives from ever being directly effective. These textual and
structural arguments are important to recount in some detail be-
cause the ECJ's response to these arguments represents the court's
only fully elaborated justification for not distinguishing directives
from the Treaty for purposes of applying the direct effect
doctrine."
The textual and structural arguments that might distinguish
directives from the Treaty, for purposes of applying the direct ef-
fect doctrine, emerge from Articles 189 and 191 of the EEC Treaty.
Article 189 states in part:
10 In Grad, the German government, under a 1968 German customs tax law, levied a
duty on an exporter for shipping preserved fruit to Austria. The exporter brought an action
against the German government alleging that the customs tax was inconsistent with article 4
of Council Dec 65/271, 1965 OJ Spec Ed 67, and article 1 of Council Dir 67/227, 1967 OJ
Spec Ed 14. 1970 ECR at 828-29.
" Although the ECJ does not have a doctrine of stare decisii similar to the one in the
United States, the court tends to follow its previous decisions. Francis Jacobs, The Court of
Justice of the European Communities 277 (Sweet & Maxwell, 1983). Remarkably, however,
Marshall embraced, without explanation, the same textual arguments that it rejected in
Grad. See Part II of this Comment.
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A regulation shall have general application. It shall be
binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all
Member States.
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be
achieved, upon each Member State to which it is ad-
dressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the
choice of form and methods.
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to
whom it is addressed. 12
Member States opposed to applying the direct effect doctrine to
directives argued that, because directives are formally addressed to
Member States, they can confer rights on individuals only through
subsequently enacted national legislation.' 3
Grad unequivocally rejected this argument, concluding that
Article 189 does not explicitly prohibit directives from creating
rights that individuals may enforce in national courts."' Relying on
Van Gend en Loos, the Advocate-General argued that the ad-
dressee of a provision is irrelevant to direct effect analysis. To the
extent that directives are clear and unconditional enough to create
justiciable rights, the mere fact that they are addressed to Member
States is legally irrelevant.' 5 Conceptually, the Advocate-General's
position stands as one of the most important counter-arguments to
the textual objections. If a sufficiently clear and unconditional di-
rective affects the rights or obligations of a private individual, as
for example one that eliminates wage discrimination or improves
the free movement of labor, then the directive should apply to in-
dividuals regardless of the formal mechanism by which it enters
national law.'"
2 Treaty Est the Eur Eco Comm, Art 189 (emphasis added).
" See id.
" The ECJ concluded that the phrase "shall be binding... upon each Member State"
should not be read to mean that only Member States are bound. Case 9/70, Grad, 1970 ECR
at 831.
" Id at 846.
"4 Professor Bebr concurs:
[The] direct effects of a binding Community act do not depend on its legal nature.
They are based on an infringement of a Community obligation irrespective of
which form of a Community act the obligation was imposed by, as may be de-
duced from the Court's significant remark according to which "it would be incom-
patible with the binding effect attributed to a directive by Article 189 to exclude,
in principle, the possibility that the obligation which it imposes may be invoked
by those concerned."
Bebr, Development of Judicial Control at 585 (cited in note 2), quoting Prelim Ruling 41/
74, Van Duyn v Home Office, 1974 ECR 1337, 1348.
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The opponents to the doctrine's extension have also argued
that the direct effect doctrine would render superfluous the dis-
tinctions that Article 189 creates between regulations and direc-
tives. Under Article 189, regulations apply directly in national law
without any formal implementation by a Member State; however,
directives typically take effect in national law only after a Member
State adopts the required implementing legislation. By allowing di-
rectives to apply directly in national law, some argue that direc-
tives would be no different than regulations.."
Grad rejected this argument as firmly as it had the other tex-
tual arguments.18 The Advocate-General conceded that the direct
effect doctrine would allow some directives to operate in national-
law-like regulations but concluded that the underlying distinction
between the two instruments would remain largely intact. The Eu-
ropean Community uses directives in part to give each Member
State the choice of how best to implement a directive's policy
goals.' 9 By contrast, the European Community promulgates regula-
tions precisely to foreclose such discretion. Thus, the distinction
between the two instruments turns largely on the need for Member
State discretion, which the direct effect doctrine preserves.
The requirement that a directive be sufficiently clear and un-
conditional before it can ,be directly effective preserves the distinc-
tions in Article 189.20 When a directive satisfies these require-
ments, the Member State would have little discretion in
implementation. Unlike the typical directive, which "leave[s] room
to the national authorities the choice of form and method [over a
its implementation]," one that is directly effective leaves little or
no room for a Member State's discretion. 22
Article 191,22 which requires that the Commission publish no-
tice of a regulation in the Official Journal, indirectly provides the
17 Case 9/70, Grad v Finanzamt Traunstein, 1970 ECR 825, 847; see also, Hartley,
Foundations at 206 (cited in note 2).
"8 Case 9/70, Grad, 1970 ECR at 847.
'" See Hans Smit and Peter Herzog, 5 The Law of the European Economic Commu-
nity: A Commentary on the EEC Treaty 5-609 (Matthew Bender, 1978).
20 Empirically, the blurring of regulations and directives has not been a problem be-
cause the sufficiently clear and unconditional requirements have prevented most directives
from having direct effect in national law. See Pescatore, 8 Eur L Rev at 171 (cited in note
7).
21 EEC, Art 189.
22 Case 9/70, Grad, 1970 ECR at 846.
23 EEC, Art 191 states:
Regulations shall be published in the Official Journal of the Community. They
shall enter into force on the date specified in them, or in the absence thereof, on
the 20th day following their publication.
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final textual argument against the direct effect of directives. Be-
cause regulations are always directly applicable in national law, the
Commission must provide notice of their promulgation; the Treaty
does not, however, require that the Commission publish notice of a
directive's adoption. The opponents of the direct effect doctrine
argue that without the Article 191 guarantees, directives could
grant rights and, more questionably, impose obligations without an
individual ever having notice of them.2 4
Completing his rejection of the textual and structural objec-
tions to recognizing the direct effects of directives, the Advocate-
General dismissed this argument as well. 5 He emphasized that if
publication serves a legal function it serves only a protective one.
Non-publication arises as a legal issue only when an individual
would incur civil liability because she acted unknowingly in contra-
vention of an unpublished directive.26 To prevent this problem, the
Advocate-General suggested that no unpublished directive can im-
pose an obligation on a private individual.2 7
Such a rule is well suited to current practice because the Com-
mission publishes most, if not all, adopted directives in the Official
Journal.2" The Advocate-General recognized that preventing the
application of the direct effect doctrine to directives, because of a
few highly exceptional cases of non-publication, is not a reasonable
legal solution to the problems of notice and legal uncertainty.29
While the Advocate-General addressed the textual objections,
the opinion of the ECJ delineated the policy rationale underlying
the direct effect doctrine." Emerging from a federalist conception
Directives and decisions shall be notified to those to whom they are addressed and
shall take effect upon notification.
"' Because the plaintiff in Grad was enforcing a right as against a Member State, the
notice discussion focused on individuals not knowing about their rights. The concern in
Grad was that "it more or less depends on chance or the shrewdness of the individual
whether he can invoke provisions of Community law favourable to him in the courts of his
country." Case 9/70, Grad, 1970 ECR at 831.
" Id at 848.
26 [Plublication is not a pre-condition of legal validity and . . . has above all a
protective function, that is . . . when it is omitted the measure tn question cannot
be employed against an individual affected. But the situation is precisely the op-
posite where an individual relies on such a measure in defence of his rights, that is
to say, seeks to derive benefits from it.
Id.
27 Id.
" Hartley, Foundations at 209 (cited in note 2).
9 Case 9/70, Grad, 1970 ECR at 848.
30 Id at 837.
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of the Community,"1 the direct effect doctrine was driven by the
court's desire to maximize the effectiveness of Community law in
the face of Member State intransigence. s" By allowing individuals
to enforce rights that the Member States had collectively agreed to
extend and decreasing the rewards of inaction that an individual
Member State may have wished to capture by delaying a direc-
tive's implementation, the ECJ believes that the effectiveness of
Community law is enhanced.33
Often, a directive's uneven pattern of adoption among the
Member States can undermine the very purpose behind the policy
that it seeks to advance. Directives designed to minimize forum
shopping or other "distortions in competitive trade" are weakened
when all Member States do not follow their Article 189 obliga-
tions.34 Given that Member States ignore their obligations to im-
plement directives more frequently than they ignore other Com-
munity obligations, and that they often collectively agree to a
directive in order to avoid collective action problems created by
cross-national legal variances, the effectiveness of Community law
under a directive may well depend on the doctrine of direct
effect.35
II. MARSHALL, DIRECT EFFECT, AND INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATIONS
The ECJ, in Marshall v Southampton, not only refused to ex-
tend the doctrine of direct effect to cover actions against private
individuals, but the court also explicitly altered the legal basis for
an individual's reliance on a directive as against a Member State.
Much of the direct effect jurisprudence preceding Marshall sug-
gested that the ECJ might have applied the direct effect doctrine
" "The objective of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a Common Market ... im-
plies that this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations
between the contracting states." Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, 1963 ECR at 11.
2 Mancini, The Making of a Constitution at 182 (cited in note 1).
" See Case 9/70, Grad, 1970 ECR at 836:
" Duncan G. Smith, The European Community Directive on Product Liability: A
Comparative Study of Its Implementation in the UK, France, and West Germany, 2 L
Issues of Eur Integration 101, 123 (1990).
" While the doctrine of direct effect allows private enforcement of Community law,
Articles 169 and 170 of the Treaty enable the Commission to pursue legal action, after ad-
ministrative review, against a Member State that it believes has failed to fulfill its Commu-
nity obligations. Scholars are divided over the effectiveness of these enforcement actions.
See, for example, Mancini, The Making of a Constitution at 182 (cited in note 1) ("Commu-
nity authorities often turn a blind eye [to infractions] . . . .and even when the Commission
institutes proceedings against the defaulting state . . . the Court cannot impose any penalty
on the offender"). But see Hartley, Foundations at 314-15 (cited in note 2) ("one can say
that the enforcement procedure is effective in the great majority of cases").
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to directives to the same extent that it covers provisions of the
Treaty. Grad emphasized the similarities between the two instru-
ments for purposes of the direct effect analysis and Defrenne es-
tablished that at least some instruments of Community law could
directly impose obligations on private individuals regardless of a
Member State's recalcitrance. The ECJ in Marshall, however, de-
clined to extend this doctrine to include directives.
In Marshall, the plaintiff worked for the Southampton and
South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority ("Health Author-
ity") from 1966 to 1980. Since the mid-1970s, the Health Authority
had a written policy, which became an implied term of Marshall's
employment contract, that women should retire at age 60 and male
employees at age 65. Marshall continued working at the Health
Authority past her sixtieth birthday, but, two years later, the
Health Authority dismissed her for the sole reason that she had
passed the retiring age for women. But for the fact that she was a
woman, Marshall would have been. allowed to work three more
years. 6
As a result of her dismissal, Marshall sued the Health Author-
ity claiming sex discrimination in violation of a Community direc-
tive that the British government had not yet incorporated into na-
tional law.3 7 The British Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed
the claims arising under the directive on the ground that an indi-
vidual could not rely on the violation of a directive in a British
court or tribunal. 8 Marshall appealed, and the British Court of
Appeals requested that the ECJ issue a preliminary ruling on the
issues of Community law.
The ECJ held that Marshall's dismissal was a violation of the
directive and that she was entitled to rely upon it as against the
state authority.3 9 Had the ECJ or British Court of Appeals found
that the Health Authority was not part of the British state, Mar-
shall would have been unable to recover under the directive.4" Al-
though this holding is consistent with the other cases involving di-
SO Case 152/84, Marshall v Southampton, 1986 ECR 723, 726.
17 Council Directive 76/207, 1976 OJ L39:40. In 1986, the British government amended
the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975 to allow others in Marshall's position to recover directly
under national law. See Marshall v Southampton ("Marshall I") 1990:3 CMLR 425, 441
(English Court of Appeals).
" Case 152/84, Marshall, 1986 ECR at 726.
" Id at 751.
" The ECJ emphasized that the boundaries of a particular state are something for each
national court to decide, to which the Advocate-General added that the national courts
should construe "state" broadly. Id at 735.
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rectives and the direct effect doctrine, Marshall concluded, in
dicta, that a directive can never impose obligations on individuals
in the absence of national implementing legislation. 1
To reach this result, the ECJ had to shift the legal basis for a
directive's effect in national law. The original rationale behind the
direct effect doctrine, that Community law should be interpreted
and applied in such a way as to enhance its effectiveness, suggested
no legal distinction between actions against a Member State and
one against a private individual.42 The Advocate-General acknowl-
edged that the effectiveness rationale is one of "general applica-
tion" but nonetheless employed a narrowing principle, the equity
principle of estoppel."
As the ECJ currently applies it, estoppel establishes a bright
line between actions against a state entity and a private individ-
ual.45 Drawing on language in Becker v Finanzamt Munster-In-
nenstadt,46 the Advocate-General argued that a Member State
that fails to adopt national legislation pursuant to a directive by a
specified date is in breach of its Article 189 obligations to imple-
ment directives and of its Article 5 obligations to follow Commu.
nity law. As a result of such a breach, a Member State "which has
not adopted the implementing measures required by the directive
.. . may not plead, as against individuals, its own failure to per-
form the obligations which the directive entails. '47 Under this ra-
tionale, non-state actors cannot be held liable under a directive be-
cause Article 189 imposes obligations only on Member States. 8
Id at 749.
2 Even some who agreed with the ECJ's position in Marshall pointed this out. See
Hartley, Foundations at 209 (cited in note 2).
" Case 152/84, Marshall, 1986 ECR at 733-34.
" Earlier ECJ cases mentioned the estoppel principle, but not until Marshall did the
ECJ raise the estoppel principle as a limiting condition on the direct effect of directives.
" Though the ECJ creates this bright line rule for actions under a directive, the na-
tional courts must still develop criteria for determining when a party is an emanation of the
state. For a good analysis of the British approach to this issue, see Deirdre Curtin, The
Province of Government: Delimiting the Direct Effect of Directives in the Common Law
Context, 15 Eur L Rev 195 (1990).
" Case 8/81, 1982.ECR 53, 1982:1 CMLR 499.
" Case 152/84, Marshall, 1986 ECR at 733-34, citing Case 8/81, Becker, 1982 ECR at
71.
48 See Case 148/78, Pubblico Ministero v Ratti, 1979 ECR 1629, 1980:1 CMLR 96. A
Member State "may not rely, as against individuals, on its own failure to perform the obli-
gations which the directive entails." Id, 1979 ECR at 1642 cited in Derrick Wyatt and Alan
Dashwood, The Substantive Law of the EEC 45 (Sweet & Maxwell, 1987). See also, Hartley,
Foundations at 208 nn 74, 75 (cited in note 2).
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To further its argument justifying a state/non-state distinc-
tion, the ECJ embraced the same textual and structural arguments
that it had rejected in Grad. Directives cannot be directly effective
as against a private individual, the Marshall court concluded, be-
cause (1) directives are addressed to the Member States, not to
individuals; (2) the Treaty does not mandate that the Commission
publish directives, thereby exposing unsuspecting individuals to
civil liability; and (3) that such an application of the doctrine
would "totally blur" the distinction between regulations and
directives. 49
In accepting these arguments without discussion, the Marshall
court departed sharply from what had previously been its unequiv-
ocal rejection of these textual barriers. The ECJ had not only dis-
missed these arguments in Grad but, also, in a line of cases that
followed. In SACE v Ministry for Finance of the Italian Repub-
lic,50 the Member States raised the same textual and structural ob-
jections, but the Advocate-General summarily dismissed them stat-
ing that Grad had "rendered pointless [these] objections."'" In
Van Duyn v Home Office,52 the ECJ reiterated its arguments from
Grad nearly verbatim. 3
III. MARSHALL: FURTHER PROBLEMS
A. The Application of Estoppel to Directives: The State/Non-
State Distinction
Marshall settles at least temporarily the legal status of direc-
tives with respect to the doctrine of direct effect.54 When a recalci-
trant Member State fails to adopt a directive, an individual may
enforce a right outlined in a sufficiently clear and unconditional
40 Case 152/84, Marshall, 1986 ECR at 734, 749.
60 Case 33/70, 1970 ECR 1213, 1971 CMLR 123. In SACE, the Italian government lev-
ied a charge for administrative services on goods that the plaintiffs had imported from an-
other Member State. The plaintiffs objected on the grounds that it was a charge having the
effect of a customs duty which is in violation of Commission Directive 68/31, 1968 JO L12:8.
See also Case 51/76, Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen v Inspecteur der Invoer-
rechten en Accijnzen, 1977 ECR 113, 1977:1 CMLR 413.
SI Case 33/70, SACE, 1970 ECR at 1228.
62 Prelim Ruling 41/74, 1974 ECR 1337.
" Id at 1348.
" See Case 221/88, CECA/Busseni, 1990 Rec 1-495; Case C-262/88, Barber v Guardian
Royal Exchange Assurance, 1990:2 CMLR 513; Case 14/86, Di Salo v Persons Unknown,
1987 ECR 2545; Case 222/84, Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary,
1986 ECR 1651, 1986:3 CMLR 240.
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directive against a Member State only through the operation of
estoppel.
To a judge or lawyer, basing the direct effect of directives on
the equity notion of estoppel may have more appeal than the
purely policy arguments of effectiveness.5 Estoppel is more con-
servative in its reach and easier to square with the textual objec-
tions. However, these factors should not compel the conclusion
that estoppel is the proper justification for the direct effect of di-
rectives. To prevent directives from creating rights that an individ-
ual can enforce against another private individual impinges upon
the effectiveness of Community law. One of the central weaknesses
of Marshall is that. it did not appreciate the extent to which the
estoppel and effectiveness rationales may conflict.
The central problem with Marshall's state/non-state distinc-
tion is that it creates inequities in the application of Community
law. This distinction means that an individual's ability to recover
for the infringement of a right outlined in a directive may turn on
the vagaries of where she lives and for whom she works. By the
ECJ's previously articulated standards, such an uneven application
of Community law should not be acceptable. In considering the
scope of a Treaty provision's direct effect, the Court in Defrenne
dismissed a state/non-state distinction precisely because it created
"unacceptable discrimination. '56
In Defrenne, the plaintiff brought an action against Sabena
for engaging in sex-based wage discrimination which Article 119 of
the EEC Treaty prohibits. Defrenne claimed that during three
years of her employment, from 1963 to 1966, she was paid less than
a male steward of the same seniority would have been. The ECJ
concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to rely on Article 119 to
enforce her claims for wage-discrimination regardless of the offend-
ing party's relationship with the Belgian state. Whether the de-
fendant, Sabena, was an emanation of the state, as a nationalized
company, or a private employer made no difference in determining
Article 119's direct effect.5 7 Recognizing the problems of discrimi-
nation that such a distinction would engender, the Advocate-Gen-
eral warned: "if we were to accept that [Article 119] is directly ap-
plicable only against public employers this would . . . constitute
fresh and unacceptable discrimination between the public and pri-
" See, for example, Hartley, Foundations at 209 (cited in note 2).
" Case 43/75, Defrenne v Sabena, 1976 ECR 455, 488.
"' "The legal status of Sabena and its relationship with the Belgian State have.., no
relevance to the present dispute." Id.
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vate sectors."58 The ECJ concurred and thus rejected the state/
non-state distinction in determining the direct effect of Treaty
provisions."
This distinction is no less of a problem in the context of direc-
tives where the estoppel regime creates inequities in the applica-
tion of Community law both within Member States and between
them. Within a Member State, the effect of Marshall is to create a
set of rights conditional upon who happens to be the opposing
party. When the opposing party is the state or an emanation of the
state, a right may exist, but if the opposing party is a private en-
tity, it may not. Imagine, for example, the situation of two female
nurses who have encountered sex-based wage discrimination.
Under Marshall, the one who happens to work for a state-run
health authority could institute an action against her public em-
ployer, but the one who happens to work for a private hospital
would have no remedy under Community law.60
Under the U.S. constitutional doctrine of state action, such
distinctions should not be surprising. Although state actors are
held to the standards of the Fourteenth Amendment, private indi-
viduals, unless barred by statute, may discriminate on the basis of
sex or race."1 In the European Community, however, Member
States adopted many social directives precisely to order private re-
lationships as well as those existing between private individuals
and the state. The directives under which individuals seek to en-
force protection for sex-based discrimination in hiring, retirement,
and wages are intended to apply to a broad category of economic
relationships that cover state as well as non-state employers.2 .
Marshall has the effect, then, of creating public/private distinc-
tions where the Member States intended none to exist.
The Marshall regime raises inequities in the application of
Community law across Member States as well as within one. The
Marshall court refused to define the term "state" for the purposes
of applying estoppel, allowing each national court to determine
50 Id.
8 Id at 475.
Hartley, Foundations at 210 (cited in note 2).
See, for example, Shelley v Kraemer, 334 US 1, 13 (1948) (the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantees protection only from the actions that "may fairly be said to be that of the
States"). However, state action can also be imputed to private actors in some circumstances.
See, for example, Burton v Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 US 715 (1961) (state action
found in private restaurant's refusal to serve black customer); Evans v Newton, 382 US 296
(1966) (providing a park held to be state action).
" See Comment, Equal Pay in the European Community: Practical and Philosophical
Goals, 1992 U Chi Legal F 477.
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which administrative agencies, local governments, nationalized
companies or private licensing groups are appropriately within the
definition of the term "state.""3 As a result, in one state a particu-
lar governmental unit or nationalized industry may be part of the
state, though its counterpart in another Member State may not
be."' To illustrate the cross-national inequities in Community law
that this state by state process of definition creates, one commen-
tator gives the example of a directive that would affect the licens-
ing of health professionals. 5 In a Member State in which the Min-
istry of Health is responsible for licensing, an individual denied the
right to practice medicine could seek a remedy under the directive,
regardless of whether the Member State had implemented the di-
rective. However, in a Member State in which a private medical
association is responsible for licensing, a similarly situated individ-
ual would have no remedy unless the state had implemented the
directive."
B. Directives, Individual Obligations, and Legal Uncertainty
Compounding the weakness of the estoppel approach is the
ECJ's failure to critically assess the argument that the full applica-
tion of the direct effect doctrine to directives would create grave
problems of notice and legal uncertainty. 7 Member States oppos-
ing expansive application of the direct effect doctrine place legal
certainty at the foundation of their critique." If individuals cannot
easily tell when they have an obligation arising under Community
law, then they will not be able to adjust their conduct to avoid civil
liability." A further problem may be that even if individuals are
6 Case 152/84, Marshall v Southampton, 1986 ECR 723, 749. For a discussion of how
British and Irish courts have defined the term "state," see J. Steiner, Coming to Terms with
EEC Directives, 106 Law Q Rev 144, 147 (1990); Curtin, 15 Eur L Rev at 195 (cited in note
45); P. E. Morris, The Direct Effect of Directives-Some Recent Developments in the Eu-
ropean Court 11, 1989 J Bus L 309, 316-19.
" The issue has arisen only in Britain and Ireland. See Curtin, 15 Eur L Rev at 199
(cited in note 45).
0 A. J. Easson, Can Directives Impose Obligations on Individuals?, 4 Eur L Rev 67, 77
(1979).
"0 This hypothetical assumes that the courts, in applying Marshall, would not define
the private medical association to be part of the state.
17 For a discussion of how legal uncertainty could be created under such a regime, see
Easson, 4 Eur L Rev at 75-76 (cited in note 65).
" See Case 9/70, Grad, 1970 ECR at 831; Case 33/70, SACE, 1970 ECR at 1217; Prelim
Ruling 41/74, Van Duyn, 1974 ECR at 1343. See also, Derrick Wyatt, The Direct Effect of
Community Social Law-Not Forgetting Directives, 8 Eur L Rev 241, 246 (1983).
9 A directive that has not yet been incorporated in national legislation cannot aggra-
vate criminal liability. See discussion at note 75.
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aware of a directive, it may be ambiguous with respect to their
rights or obligations. Such arguments cannot withstand close.
scrutiny.
1. Problems of notice and legal certainty.
A legal regime in which individuals are bound by directives
creates only marginal uncertainty. Individuals already have a re-
sponsibility to know their obligations under Community law be-
cause regulations and decisions, as well as the Treaty, may impose
duties on them. This responsibility is particularly pronounced with
regulations since the Commission issues regulations more fre-
quently than directives.70
Even if the European Community issued directives with
greater frequency, most would not be directly effective. 71 An indi-
vidual cannot enforce a right contained in a directive until a Mem-
ber State is in default of its Article 189 obligations, which occurs
only after it has failed to adopt the required implementing legisla-
tion by the date specified in the directive. Since Member States
adopt a majority of the directives promulgated, 2 the issue of direct
effect does not frequently arise. Even when it does, the ECJ only
gives direct effect to those directives that satisfy the conditions of
clarity and unconditionality. Most directives do not satisfy these
73conditions.
Because directives are not typically directly effective and
nearly all are published in the Official Journal as a matter of prac-
tice, the problems of notice and legal certainty are arguably less
than those arising from other instruments of Community law.
Against such a backdrop, Professors Derrick Wyatt and Alan
Dashwood argue that Marshall fails by preventing individuals
from enforcing rights against other private individuals, "even in
cases where [such enforcement] . ..could not prejudice [an indi-
vidual's] legal security." They suggest that the ECJ should have
adopted a case by case approach that allows an individual to plead
legal uncertainty as a complete defense.7'
Historically, the ECJ has responded flexibly to issues of legal
uncertainty when they have arisen. Consider, for example, the Ad-
70 Easson, 4 Eur L Rev at 76 (cited in note 65).
7' Pescatore, 8 Eur L Rev at 171 (cited in note 7).
72 See, for example, Report of the Commission to the Council and European Parliament
on the Implementation of Measures Completing the Internal Market, 1991 COM 2491 at 1,
Annexes 1, 2, 4.
71 Pescatore, 8 Eur L Rev at 171 (cited in note 7).
7, Wyatt & Dashwood, The Substantive Law of the EEC at 47 (cited in note 48).
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vocate-General's rule in Grad that an unpublished directive cannot
grant a right or impose an obligation on anyone. In the context of
criminal law, where problems of legal certainty and notice may cre-
ate unacceptably large risks, the ECJ stated unequivocally that an
individual cannot'suffer a criminal sanction through the operation
of a directive that a Member State has not incorporated into na-
tional law.75 Where a Member State has implemented a directive,
the ECJ held recently that national courts cannot use a directive
as an interpretative source to construe an unclear or ambiguous
statute, passed pursuant to a directive, when the effect would be to
enhance a defendant's criminal liability.76
2. Ambiguous directives and direct effect.
Although a directive may be clear and unconditional enough
to satisfy the prerequisites for direct effect, it may be ambiguous
with respect to the precise legal duties that it creates. The ECJ
confronted this issue in Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange.7 In
Barber, the plaintiff sued his employer, arguing that sex-based rate
differences in the company's pension plan violated Article 119 of
the Treaty which prohibits sex-based wage discrimination. The
employer appeared to be aware of its obligations under Article 119
but argued that wages 'do not include benefits such as a pension
plan. The ECJ rejected the employer's position and held that dis-
crimination in future benefits constitutes sex-based wage discrimi-
nation. Since the defendant could not have reasonably known that
Article 119 reached its pension plans, the ECJ applied its holding
prospectively.7 s In Defrenne, the ECJ similarly chose to apply its
holding prospectively.79 Thus, the ECJ has demonstrated that it
can create parsimonious and flexible solutions to lessen the other-
wise harsh impact of the direct effect doctrine without having to
reject the doctrine altogether.
" Case 372-374/85, The State v Oscar Traen, 1987 ECR 2141, 1988:3 CMLR 511; Di
Sato, 1987 ECR 2545; Case 80/86, Officier Van Justitie v Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV, 1989:2
CMLR 18. In principle, the ECJ's position is redundant because a state could not prosecute
someone under a directive when it has itself failed to implement the legislation required by
the directive.
16 Joined Cases 206/88, 207/88, Vessoso v Zanetti (transcript) (LEXIS, Europe Library,
Cases File).
7 Case C-262/88, 1990:2 CMLR 513.
71 Id at 558.
71 Case 43/75, Defrenne, 1976 ECR at 482.
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IV. PARALLEL DEVELOPMENTS: FROM VON COLSON TO MARLEASING
A parallel development in the ECJ's direct effect jurispru-
dence suggests that even the ECJ may not be fully convinced that
Marshall is rightly decided. Beginning in 1984 with Von Colson
and Kamann v Land Nordrhein- Westfalen8° and culminating in
1990 with Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Ali-
mentaci6n SA, 81 the ECJ developed a doctrine that permits a di-
rective to impose obligations on individuals even though a Member
State has not adequately implemented it. In Von Colson, the ECJ
held that courts, to the extent permitted by national law, have a
duty to interpret statutes adopted pursuant to a directive in light
of the directive's aim and purpose. This duty may result in the
creation of individual rights and obligations that may not have ex-
isted but for the use of Community law as an interpretative aid.
In Von Colson, the West German government implemented a
directive designed to eliminate sex-based discrimination in hiring
but provided only nominal sanctions for those who violated the
statute. Aggrieved parties could recover only for damages to their
reliance interest, which amounted to little more than the cost of
the postage stamp that they used to mail their application.2 Even
though by law employers were prohibited from sex-based hiring
discrimination, they in fact faced nominal penalties for doing so.
Recognizing that this remedy did not provide sufficient incentives
for employers to change their discriminatory hiring practices, the
ECJ instructed German courts to read a stronger remedy into the
statute."
The ECJ reasoned that, because a national court is part of the
state, it too has a duty under Article 5 of the Treaty to implement
a directive's principles. This duty requires that courts "interpret
[their] national law in the light of the wording and purpose of the
directive. '84 Thus, where a statute fails to incorporate the means
sufficient to achieve a directive's goals, the national courts should
make the necessary adjustments.
The ECJ has explicitly acknowledged that the application of
the Von Colson interpretative strategy may result in the imposi-
80 Case 14/83, 1984 ECR 1891, 1986:2 CMLR 430. See also Case 79/83, Harz v Deutsche
Tradax GmbH, 1984 ECR 1921, 1986:2 CMLR 430.
81 Case C-106/89, 1992:1 CMLR 305.
82 The West German court had originally awarded the plaintiff DM 7.20 (roughly
.$2.50). Case 14/83, Von Colson, 1986:2 CMLR at 448.
11 Id at 447.
84 Id at 453.
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tion of private obligations where none may have existed under na-
tional law. The Advocate-General stated candidly in Vessoso v
Zanetti that:
[The] rule of interpretation [from Von Colson] may thus
have the result that obligations may arise and be enforce-
able in civil proceedings between private parties which
would not result from an interpretation of the national
legislation taken in isolation."'
Through Von Colson, the ECJ achieves the same objectives-the
effectiveness of directives and the imposition of individual obliga-
tions-that the direct effect doctrine could supposedly not achieve
because of the Treaty's text.
Left unanswered in Von Colson was the full extent of the in-
terpretative strategy's reach. Did it, for example, cover only stat-
utes enacted pursuant to a directive or did it also extend to stat-
utes adopted prior to a directive's promulgation? In Marleasing,
the ECJ gave the Von Colson interpretative strategy its full reach
by holding that national courts should interpret laws enacted
before a directive's promulgation in light of the latter's aim and
purpose."' Thus, even where a recalcitrant Member State makes no
attempt to implement a directive, a national court can interpret a
previously enacted statute to conform with a directive.
Taken together, Von Colson and Marleasing challenge Mar-
shall's fundamental conclusion that directives do not impose obli-
gations on individuals without specific implementing legislation.
While Von Colson may strain the reasoning in Marshall, Marleas-
ing actually tends to contradict the Marshall holding. The textual
arguments that the ECJ embraced in Marshall suggest that direc-
tives impose obligations on individuals only after a Member State
has enacted the required implementing legislation. Similarly, the
estoppel rationale suggests that individual obligations arise only
through the operation of a statute enacted pursuant to a directive.
The central principle of Marshall-that directives impose obliga-
tions on individuals only through the operation of national
law-remains intact but only because the courtsi in addition to the
national legislatures, are now agents through which a directive can
enter national law.
" Joined Cases 206/88, Vessoso. Vessoso effectively limits Von Colson to civil cases.
" Case C-106/89, Marleasing, 1992:1 CMLR at 322-323; see also J. Stuyck and P. Wy-
tinck, Case Note, Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentaci6n SA, 28
Common Mkt L Rev 205 (1991).
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Although, in theory, the Von Colson interpretative strategy
may lessen Marshall's impact, national courts have not been will-
ing to follow it. National courts may be no less hostile to the Von
Colson interpretative strategy than they were to the ECJ's at-
tempts to extend the direct effect doctrine.8 7 One need go no fur-
ther than the British courts' hostile reaction to Von Colson to see
that this alternative route to maximizing the effectiveness of direc-
tives may not fully succeed.
In Duke v Reliance Systems Ltd.,88 the House of Lords re-
jected the argument that Von Colson applies to statutes enacted
prior to the European Community's promulgation of a directive.
According to Duke, British courts should only use a directive as an
interpretative source when a statute is passed pursuant to a direc-
tive. Moreover, Duke suggested that in construing a statute, na-
tional courts should examine "the circumstances prevailing at the
date of enactment."89 While avoiding the question of what weight a
directive should carry, Duke implied that a directive is not the au-
thoritative source but merely one of many that a judge should con-
sult in construing a statute. Duke bluntly concluded that the act
through which Great Britain entered the Community 0 "does not
• ..enable or constrain a British court to distort the meaning of a
British statute in order to enforce against an individual a Commu-
nity directive which has no direct effect between individuals." 91
Even though later cases indicate that the British courts may be
willing to use a directive as an interpretative aid in construing leg-
islation passed pursuant to a directive,92 the courts continue to
bristle at the notion that they must construe preexisting legislation
to conform to a subsequent directive. 3 Similar resistance by other
national courts has led some commentators to conclude that "there
is no clear line in national court decisions as to the extent to which
they will follow Von Colson."9
87 For a discussion of national courts' reactions to the direct effect doctrine, see, gener-
ally, Hartley, Foundations at 225-27, 230-32 (cited in note 2).
88 1988:1 CMLR 719 (House of Lords).
89 Marshall v Southampton ("Marshall I"), 1990:3 CMLR 425, 439 (citing Lord Tem-
plemen in Duke, 1988:1 CMLR at 731). At issue in Marshall II was the remedy to which the
plaintiff was entitled.
90 European Communities Act, sec 2(4) (1972).
1' Marshall 11, 1990:3 CMLR at 439 (quoting Lord Templemen in Duke, 1988:1 CMLR
at 732).
92 See Litster v Forth Dry Dock & Engineering Co Ltd, 1989 IRLR 161; Pickstone and
others v Freemans plc, 1989 AC 66.





The reluctance of national courts to use directives as an inter-
pretative aid to create greater rights than a statute originally
granted reinforces a political explanation for Marshall. Histori-
cally, the doctrine of direct effect has generated hostile reactions
from national courts. Indeed, in a widely reported incident, the
French Conseil d'Etat held that an individual could not rely on a
directive in an' administrative hearing thereby unilaterally limiting
the direct effect doctrine in France without consulting the ECJ.95
Even commentators who support the reasoning behind Marshall
recognize that the decision was largely shaped by political realities.
The hostile reactions of the Conseil d'Etat, as well as the German
Bundesfinanzhof, to the direct effect doctrine, "[were] obviously a
serious matter and, while the European Court refused to retreat
from the position it had adopted [in Grad, the Marshall court]
probably considered it expedient not to press any further."9
Ultimately, even if one is persuaded that Marshall was
wrongly decided, the political challenge for the ECJ remains. Both
the hostile reaction of the national courts to the doctrine of direct
effect and the reluctance of the national courts to utilize the Von
Colson interpretative approach reveal the ECJ's weak institutional
position. The ECJ relies, to a large extent, on the good will of the
national courts for its political effectiveness:97 its ability to extend
the effectiveness of Community law depends largely on the willing-
ness of national courts to refer cases to it under Article 177, and to
enforce ECJ interpretations through the coercive power of national
law. 8 National courts, until they are willing to accept in principle
that a directive can impose obligations on individuals, will effec-
tively check the ECJ's doctrinal moves.
See Hartley, Foundations at 228-36 (cited in note 2). For further discussion on how
the national courts have reacted to the direct effect doctrine see, Pescatore, 8 Eur L Rev at
169-170 (cited in note 7); Mancini, The Making of a Constitution at 182 (cited in note 1);
Steiner, 106 L Q Rev at 145 (cited in note 63).
96 Hartley, Foundations at 209 (cited in note 2).
"' Mancini, Making of a Constitution at 178 (cited in note 1).
98 Id.
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